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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW
OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. UNITED STATES V. YOUNG: SUPREME COURT RULES THAT
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF GUILT PREVENTS PROSECUTOR'S
CONDUCT FROM CONSTITUTING PLAIN ERROR
United States v. Young I belongs to an unfortunate line of criminal
cases in which the predominate issue concerns attorney misconduct
rather than the accused's guilt or innocence. ChiefJustice Burger, writ-
ing for a five member majority, reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision
which had reversed the district court's conviction of Young. 2 The con-
troversy which brought the case up to the Supreme Court involved the
question of whether attorney misconduct during Young's trial fell under
the "plain error" exception to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Rule 52(b) permits an appeal, absent a timely objection,
of "plain errors" or "defects" in trial proceedings which affect substan-
tial rights. 3 The Supreme Court ruled that the misconduct, which in-
cluded prosecutorial remarks regarding Young's intent to defraud and
personal beliefs that Young was guilty, constituted harmless error. Dis-
agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's finding of "plain error," the Supreme
Court reinstated Young's conviction in light of the "overwhelming evi-
dence" of guilt which eliminated any doubt that the prosecutor's re-
marks unfairly prejudiced the jury.
4
A. Facts
Billy G. Young, vice president and general manager of Compton
Petroleum Corporation, entered into a contract with Apco Oil Corpora-
tion to deliver monthly supplies of "sweet crude" oil. 5 By substituting a
mix of fuel oil and high gravity condensate for sweet crude oil and by
obtaining false certification on delivery invoices, Young deceived Apco
and prompted the FBI investigation which ultimately led to his
indictment.
6
At trial, after the prosecution had summarized the evidence against
Young, defense counsel began his own summation in which he claimed
that the prosecution had presented the case unfairly, had poisoned the
1. 105 S. Ct. 1038 (1984).
2. 736 F.2d 565 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 provides:
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be no-
ticed although they were not brought to the attention of the Court.
4. 105 S. Ct. at 1049.
5. Id. at 1040.
6. Id. at 1041.
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
jurors' minds, and had "deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence."
7
The defense attorney also asserted that no person in the courtroom, in-
cluding the prosecutor, believed that Billy Young intended to defraud
Apco. 8 Instead of objecting to the defense counselor's summation, the
government prosecutor attempted to refute the allegation that the gov-
ernment did not believe in its own case by proffering his personal im-
pression that Young did in fact defraud Apco:
"I think [defense counsel] said that not anyone sitting at this
table thinks that Mr. Young intended to defraud Apco. Well, I
was sitting there and I think he was.... I think he did [intend to
defraud]. If we are allowed to give our personal impressions
since it was asked of me."-
9
Defense counsel neither objected to the prosecutor's statements
nor requested any curative instructions from the bench.' 0 Young was
found guilty of mail fraud and of knowingly making false statements and
was sentenced to four years imprisonment and fined $39,000.11
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for
retrial, ruling that the remarks made by the prosecutor during his clos-
ing rebuttal constituted prosecutorial misconduct.12 The court held this
misconduct to be "sufficiently egregious to constitute plain error."
Thus, defense counsel's failure to object was not fatal to appellate re-
view. 13 The Tenth Circuit's opinion can be viewed as a swift, albeit cur-
sory response to attorney misconduct. The court apparently believed
that a weak response to this problem could only lead to an increase in
7. Id. (citing Trial Record at 542).
8. Id.
9. Id. (quoting Trial Record at 549) (emphasis in Tenth Circuit opinion). The prose-
cutor also stated:
"I don't know whether you call it honor and integrity, I don't call it that, [defense
counsel] does. If you feel you should acquit him for that its your pleasure. I
don't think you're doing your job as jurors in finding facts as opposed to the law
that this Judge is going to instruct you, you think that's honor and integrity then
stand up here in [an] Oklahoma courtroom and say that's honor and integrity; I
don't believe it."
Id. at 1041-42 (quoting Trial Record at 552).
10. Id. at 1042.
11. Id.
12. United States v. Young, 736 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1038
(1984). Circuit Judge Seth and District Judge Brimmer handed down a per curium opin-
ion addressing two issues. The first issue involved the admissibility of hearsay testimony
of a witness who had died three years prior to trial. The second issue concerned the im-
propriety of remarks made by the prosecutor in final argument. The court dealt exten-
sively with the hearsay issue and found that the defendant's sixth amendment right to
confrontation was not violated by the admission of the deceased witness' statements. The
court, only briefly addressing the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, cited several state-
ments made by the prosecutor and concluded that the transcript "spoke for itself." Id. at
567-70. Circuit Judge McWilliams dissented without writing an opinion.
13. Id. at 570. The court gave little credence to the argument that the prosecutor's
comments merely countered the defense counsel's assertion that the prosecutor did not
believe Young intended to defraud Apco. According to the court, improper conduct on




the frequency of misconduct. 14 In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court did not annunciate any legal distinctions by which one could dis-
cern whether an error was harmless, or whether it was "plain" and thus
reversible absent objection.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority,
stated that the principal issue to be resolved in Young was not merely
whether the prosecutor's remarks amounted to error, but whether that
error was so damaging as to require reversal absent a timely objection.15
Disapproving of the courtroom activity involved, the Court chastised
both the prosecution and the defense by emphasizing that "[t]he kind of
advocacy shown by this record has no place in the administration ofjus-
tice and should neither be permitted nor rewarded .... 1,,6 Similarly, the
Court stated that the trial judge was obligated to "maintain decorum"
and to immediately rectify any breach of courtroom propriety.'
7
Following these initial reprimands, however, the Court invoked the
"invited response" rule which permits an attorney to mitigate an oppos-
ing counselor's improper comments by responding with remarks of like
caliber.' 8 The Court stated that a balancing process is required to de-
termine whether such invited responses merely righted the scale or
whether they were overreactions, detrimental to the administration of
justice. 19 According to this rule, "the issue is not the prosecutor's li-
cense to make otherwise improper arguments, but whether the prosecu-
tor's 'invited response,' taken in context, unfairly prejudiced the
defendant."' 20 If this delicate balance is attained, otherwise improper
14. The court inferred that such misconduct is a recurring problem in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, citing United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's closing
rebuttal accusing defense investigator of contriving defense testimony constituted plain
and prejudicial error); United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1975) (prosecu-
tor's argument, which was outside the scope of proven facts, asserted personal belief of the
prosecutor and thus constituted prejudicial error; new trial granted); United States v. Lud-
wig, 508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974) (unprofessional defense conduct does not allow similar
conduct on the part of the prosecutor; prosecutor's personal opinion of the integrity of the
police constitutes prejudicial error); United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir.
1973) (prosecutor's own opinion as to guilt constituted ethical violation).
15. 105 S. Ct. at 1046.
16. Id. at 1043.
17. Id. at 1044. With the admitted advantage of hindsight, the Court noted that the
better remedy would have been for the district court judge to intervene and admonish the
errant party, thus eliminating the need for an "invited response" by opposing counsel.
This language led Justice Brennan, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, to conclude
that the majority had decided that federal prosecutors do not have a "right" to reply but
must object. Id. at 1050 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra
note 26.
18. 105 S. Ct. at 1044. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (prosecutor's
opinion as to credibility of government witness in response to defense counsel's state-
ments that witnesses were perjurers did not unfairly prejudice the defendant; invited re-
sponse rule invoked).
19. 105 S. Ct. at 1045.
20. Id. The Court admonished the Tenth Circuit for not abiding by previous
19861
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comments would not warrant reversing a conviction. 2 '
In applying this rule to the facts, the Court found that the prosecu-
tor's remarks, although inappropriate and amounting to error, did not
rise to the level of plain error because they did not undermine the fun-
damental fairness of the trial nor contribute to a miscarriage ofjustice.
22
Although the majority admitted that the prosecutor's expression of per-
sonal opinion was improper and unnecessary, the Court concluded that
any potential harm from such remarks was mitigated by the jury's under-
standing that the remarks were merely in response to the defense coun-
sel's attack on the prosecutor's integrity. 23 The Court also asserted that
the prosecutor's judgmental interjection was inconsequential because
"the overwhelming evidence" of Young's intent to defraud Apco elimi-
nated any doubt that the government's advocacy may have prejudiced
the jury's decision. 24 Thus, although the prosecutor's conduct was
deemed error by the Court, it did not constitute plain error and there-
fore did not warrant the Tenth Circuit's reversal absent a timely objec-
tion from defense counsel.
25
2. Justice Brennan's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Brennan concurred with the majority on three spe-
cific points,2 6 he vigorously disagreed with the majority's use of the "in-
vited response" doctrine and criticized the Court for "reaching out" to
apply the plain error analysis on its own instead of remanding the ques-
tion to the circuit court.
Justice Brennan believed that the majority's "invited error" analysis
was flawed for several reasons. First, Justice Brennan stated that be-
cause federal prosecutors are held to a higher standard of conduct than
ordinary plaintiff's attorneys, they have " 'the responsibility of a minis-
ter of justice and not simply that of an advocate.' ",27 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court precedent which directed that prosecutorial comments be weighed within
the context of the factual situation. Critical of the Tenth Circuit's seemingly flippant use
of the plain error exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, the Court stated that
the exception should be used sparingly and only in circumstances in which a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)
(extension of the plain error rule would encourage trial participants to seek appellate re-
view of questionable errors which would, in turn, interfere with the speedy administration
of justice).
21. 105 S. Ct. at 1045. The majority was quick to point out that its use of the balanc-
ing test was not to be interpreted as "suggesting judicial approval--or encouragement-of
response-in-kind that inevitably exacerbate the tensions inherent in the adversary pro-
cess." Id.
22. Id. at 1048.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1049.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1050. He agreed that federal prosecutors do not have a right to reply to
defense improprieties; rather, they should object to the trial judge, see supra note 17. Fur-
thermore, he agreed that federal courts may establish rules of conduct, violation of which
constitutes error. Finally, he agreed that the Tenth Circuit's reversal could not stand. 105
S. Ct. at 1050.
27. Id. at 1052 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(1980); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.8, at 3.88 (2d ed. 1980)).
476 [Vol. 63:2
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majority's holding "trivialized" this higher standard which federal pros-
ecutors are required to meet. 28 Furthermore, Justice Brennan asserted
that finding an error to be reasonable, or necessary to counterbalance
opposing error, was inherently contradictory, and had the effect of
"minimizing the gravity" of the attorney misconduct.2 9 Similarly, Justice
Brennan stated that the majority's righting the scale argument, "smacks
of the 'sporting theory of justice.' ",30 He thought it "cavalier" for the
Court, after enumerating the possible risks inherent in the invited re-
sponse doctrine, to decree that the prosecutor's assertions in this case
did not unduly influence the jury.
3 1
Aside from disagreeing with the invited response concept, Justice
Brennan criticized the majority for not remanding the case to the Tenth
Circuit in conformance with usual practice. He stated that deciding such
cases is not only at variance with long established procedure and a mis-
understanding of the Court's role, but also sets an unwise precedent. As
a result, the Court may become increasingly involved in matters more
appropriately handled at the circuit court level.3 2 According to Justice
Brennan, Court procedure requires that the Supreme Court outline ap-
propriate standards and remand cases to the circuit courts for applica-
tion of such standards.33 With this premise, Justice Brennan suggested
that the Court should have simply instructed the Tenth Circuit to ad-
dress the two-pronged plain error test; whether the conduct prejudiced
the verdict when viewed in context and whether the conduct " 'seriously
affect[ed] the.., integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceed-
28. 105 S. Ct. at 1052. Justice Brennan also noted that a government prosecutor is
inherently more persuasive to a jury and hence, misconduct by a government attorney
carries more weight than similar responses by a defense attorney.
29. Id. at 1053.
30. Id. at 1052 n.4 (quoting Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With The Adminis-
tation of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (1906)).
31. 105 S. Ct. at 1054. Justice Brennan also criticised the Court for concluding in two
brief paragraphs that the evidence of Young's guilt was "overwhelming." In support of
this finding, the Court stated that since the jury acquitted Young of the most serious
charges (interstate transportation of stolen property), the prosecutorial misconduct obvi-
ously did not unduly influence the jury. Yet, Justice Brennan pointed out that Young's
acquital of serious charges runs contrary to any assertions of "overwhelming" guilt. Such
an outcome seems more likely to reflect a compromise verdict, raising the question of how
prejudicial the prosecutorial misconduct actually was. Id. at 1055. Furthermore, because
Young was convicted of "intent" crimes, credibility was of more concern than if he were
accused of non-intent crimes. The improper attacks on Young's credibility by the prosecu-
tor could thus have had a far more prejudicial impact upon the jury.
Moreover,Justice Brennan cited substantial evidence to negate any intentional wrong-
doing by Young. Young had only an eighth grade education and may have been convinced
by corporate officers of the legality of the certification practices he was involved in. The
fact that Apco had received and tested the blend for seven months before noting the viola-
tions also refutes any obvious violations on Young's part. Additionally, government wit-
nesses testified that the complex standards were incomprehensible and that they
personally did not believe Young actually intended to defraud Apco. Id. at 1055 n.15.
32. Id. at 1056.
33. Justice Brennan stated that it was "impossible" for any Supreme Court Justice to
"make the kind of conscientious and detailed examination of the record" which the issue
of prejudicial error required. Id. (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
1986] 477
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ings.' -34 Justice Brennan reminded the majority that the Court's pri-
mary function is to resolve and supervise issues of federal law, not to
correct factual errors. By engaging in specific factual determinations
and thereby distinguishing plain error from harmless error, the Court,
according to Justice Brennan, has veered onto a course which could lead
to future encounters with issues better resolved by the lower courts.
3 5
3. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' dissent did not focus upon the plain error doctrine,
central to both the majority's and Justice Brennan's opinions. Instead,
Justice Stevens stated that a reversal in criminal convictions is proper if
trial error either reflects prosecutorial misconduct or is obviously preju-
dicial to the accused. 3 6 Since the Court unanimously concluded that the
prosecutor's response to defense counsel's closing argument had
crossed the lines of permissible conduct of the legal profession, the
prosecutorial misconduct constituted error and therefore warranted a
reversal.3 7 According to Justice Stevens, the second element of preju-
dice was also evident. Stating that he did "not understand how anyone
could dispute the proposition that the prosecutor's comments were ob-
viously prejudicial," Justice Stevens noted that the majority neither af-
firmed nor denied that the prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the
accused. In fact, the majority merely stated that the error did not "un-
fairly" prejudice the jury.
3 8
Justice Stevens, however, disagreeing with Justice Brennan, did not
believe that the case should be remanded. Justice Stevens did not find
the Tenth Circuit's opinion to be as cryptic as the majority and Justice
Brennan, in their opinions, would have one believe.3 9 According tojus-
tice Stevens, the Tenth Circuit was capable of discerning the difference
between harmless and plain error and, although not articulated, the
court must have engaged in such an analysis. For this reason, the Tenth
Circuit's decision deserved the respect usually afforded circuit courts.
Thus, Justice Stevens would have simply affirmed the court's judgment,
eliminating an unnecessary remand or a dubious and unprecedented de-
cision on the merits.
40
D. Conclusion
Violations of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility deserve
34. 105 S. Ct. at 1056 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
35. 105 S. Ct. at 1056.
36. Id. at 1057 (citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1983)).
37. 105 S. Ct. at 1057.
38. Id. at 1058. According to Justice Stevens, the majority came to such a conclusion
partly because the prosecutor's response was invited and partly because "the Court is con-
vinced that respondent is guilty." Id. at 1057.
39. Id. Because prior case history was reviewed by the Tenth Circuit and the tran-
scripts appeared to speak for themselves, Justice Stevens believed that the court had suffi-





stern and unqualified judicial condemnation. 4 1 The inability of the
Court to take a firm stance against attorney misconduct does not aid in
clarifying an already confusing area. While an attorney's improper com-
ments may be so prejudicial to the jury as to make an order from the
bench seem effete, the countervailing concerns regarding proper judi-
cial proceedings would seem to override such fears. By accepting an
invited response analysis, the Court creates a gray zone of attorney con-
duct where the distinctions between "error" and "reasonableness" are
inherently blurred. Moreover, after Young, whether an attorney merely
rights the scale as opposed to tipping the scale depends upon subtle and
subjective distinctions.
Litigators are trained to be aggressive and our judicial system fos-
ters the adversarial resolution of claims. Because government prosecu-
tors represent the people, our society expects that they will try each case
with the utmost zeal. Yet caution must be taken to prevent judicial con-
testants from adopting the rules of all-out war. Prosecutors, as well as
all other attorneys, must remember that the desire to win should always
be tempered with the dignity of the legal profession, and judges must
oversee judicial proceedings to ensure the proper decorum of the court-
room. A travesty of justice is committed, and the esteemed position of
the profession is denigrated, when officers of the court neglect their ob-
ligations. These concerns become even more compelling when a per-
son's freedom is at stake, as in a criminal case.
The Tenth Circuit is chastised by the majority and Justice Brennan
for its cryptic ruling. Although one would usually expect a circuit court
to spell out the technical reasons behind its rulings, it would be surpris-
ing, as Justice Stevens noted, if the Tenth Circuit did not have either, if
not both, of the traditional premises in mind when deciding the issue of
plain error. One would think that the Supreme Court would show more
respect for its circuit courts. In light of the potential increase of appeals
on issues concerning "plain error," prudence alone would seem to sup-
ply reason enough to give the Tenth Circuit the benefit of such doubt in
United States v. Young. Finally, the Supreme Court's use of an invited re-
sponse analysis may also encourage, rather than discourage, the type of
misconduct presented in this case.
II. WILSON v. GARCIA: THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINES THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 4 2 provides a procedural rem-
41. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-106(C) (1980) provides:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility
of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence
of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position
or conclusion with respect to matters stated herein.
42. 42 U.S.C § 1983 provides:
19861
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edy to every person deprived of constitutional rights by action of state
authority. The statute does not set forth a specific statute of limitations.
Historically, state law has supplied the applicable time period. Pursuant
to section 1988, 4 3 federal courts can apply state law to section 1983 ac-
tions where federal law is deficient and the state law is not inconsistent
with the federal Constitution. Thus, in section 1983 actions, federal
courts are faced with the task of determining which state statute of limi-
tations controls the federal claim. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts
have differed substantially in their approaches to this problem. 44 Re-
sponding to this divergence in the circuit courts, the Supreme Court, in
Wilson v. Garcia,4 5 attempted to resolve this problem by setting forth a
standard by which federal courts are to characterize all section 1983 ac-
tions for the purpose of applying state statutes of limitation. Affirming
the Tenth Circuit,4 6 the Supreme Court held that the appropriate state
statute of limitation applicable to claims arising under section 1983 is
best determined by characterizing all such claims as personal injury ac-
tions. Wilson v. Garcia involved the balancing of states' interests in rea-
sonable time limitations with the federal interests in uniform and easily
applied rules. In so doing, the Court clarified the procedure involved in
applying statutes of limitations to section 1983 claims and left the sub-
stantive determination of actual time limits contained in such statutes to
the states.
A. Facts
Gary Garcia brought an action in federal court under section 1983
against Richard Wilson, a New Mexico state police officer, and Martin
Vigil, the chief of the state police, seeking damages for deprivation of his
constitutional rights.4 7 Garcia filed suit approximately two years and
nine months after the incident purportedly took place.4 8 The defend-
ants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:
[I]n all [civil rights] cases where [the laws of the United States] are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable reme-
dies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
44. See infra note 55.
45. 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
46. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984).
47. 105 S. Ct. at 1940. Garcia alleged that Wilson viciously beat him on his face and
body with a "slapper" (a strip of leather weighted at one end with a piece of lead) and then
sprayed his face with tear gas. He further alleged that the hiring of Wilson as a state police
officer constituted negligence because the chief knew, or should have known, that Wilson




two-year New Mexico statute of limitation dealing with tort claims
against a government employee. The district court denied the motion,
holding that the New Mexico statute providing a four-year limitation pe-
riod for "all other actions not herein otherwise provided for," applied to
section 1983 actions because such actions were best characterized as ac-
tions based on statute rather than tort.4 9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's refusal to dismiss, but held that the appropriate statute of
limitation for section 1983 actions brought in New Mexico was the New
Mexico statute providing a three year limitation period for personal in-
jury actions.
50
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit delivered an en banc opinion in order to harmo-
nize its decisions in this area, resolve prior inconsistencies, and establish
a uniform approach for application of statutes of limitation in future
cases. 5 1 First, the court stated that although federal courts are bound by
a state's construction of its own statutes of limitation, it is a federal ques-
tion whether a particular state statute is applicable to a federal claim.
52
Second, the Tenth Circuit noted the lack of guidance from both the
Supreme Court 53 and Congress in setting forth a method by which a
uniform statute of limitation for section 1983 claims could be deter-
mined. 5 4 The Tenth Circuit then outlined the different approaches
taken by the twelve circuits. 5 5 According to the court, these diverse ap-
49. The trial court's decision directly contravened a previous decision of the New
Mexico Supreme Court in DeVargus v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982),
which held that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act provided the most closely analogous
state cause of action to section 1983 claims.
50. 731 F.2d at 651.
51. Id. at 642. Garcia was one of four decisions handed down by the Tenth Circuit on
the same day in an attempt to fix the limitation periods for the entire circuit. See Hamilton
v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1984) (Kansas' two-year statute for inju-
ries to the rights of another not arising out of a contract applied to section 1983 actions);
Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (because no Utah statute of limi-
tation expressly applied to actions for injury to the rights of another, the four-year statute
for actions not otherwise provided for by law applied to section 1983 claims); McKay v.
Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (the three-year statute for all other actions not
provided for by law applies to section 1983 actions in Colorado). All three cases, like
Garcia, involved alleged actions of police officers against arrestees or potential arrestees.
52. 731 F.2d at 643 (citing Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist., 699 F.2d 137,
141-42 (3d Cir. 1983) and Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 n.6 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)).
53. The Court's previous guidance in selecting the proper statute of limitation period
included such ambivalent instructions as: "the state law of limitations governing an analo-
gous cause of action," Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980); "to
adopt the local law of limitation," Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); "apply
the most appropriate one provided by state law," Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
54. 731 F.2d at 643.
55. For example, while the First Circuit characterized a section 1983 action as sound-
ing in tort in a wrongful termination case, see Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens,
575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1978), it disregarded this characterization in a subsequent case
dealing with the wrongful termination of a public employee, applying instead a state stat-
ute covering racial discrimination claims, see Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 106 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893 (1980). This stands in contrast to the Second and Ninth Circuits'
1986]
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proaches typify the ambiguity stemming from the judicial and congres-
sional lack of guidance in the area. The court asserted that "[t]he
fundamental point of disagreement in selecting a statute of limitations
for civil rights actions is whether such claims should be characterized in
terms of the specific facts generating a particular suit, or whether a more
general characterization ... should be applied regardless of the discrete
facts involved."
5 6
The court decided to adopt a general characterization for all civil
rights claims based upon its perception of the nature of such claims,
rather than relying upon the specific facts underlying each action. 57 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the comparison of civil rights claims with
particular state actions would lead to several problems. For example,
because virtually any section 1983 claim could be fitted under a number
of state causes of action, the resulting uncertainty encourages both par-
ties to argue state factual analogies favorable to their respective posi-
tions. 58 Further, the court stated that such unequal treatment of similar
claims, especially in the context of socially sensitive civil rights litigation,
may lead to the inference that the holdings are result oriented, thereby
weakening the efficacy of the ruling.59 As a result, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that articulation of one uniform characterization describing
the essential nature underlying all section 1983 claims would best facili-
tate the selection of a limitation period reflecting federal values.
60
The court indicated that there were two ways in which to reach this
result. It could characterize the fundamental nature of civil rights claims
as actions on liability created by statute, or it could treat such claims as
actions for injury to the rights of another.6 1 Because the Tenth Circuit
believed that every section 1983 claim essentially arises from personal
injuries, it concluded that, henceforth, all section 1983 claims should be
uniformly characterized as actions for injury to personal rights for stat-
characterization of all section 1983 claims as actions created by statute (rather than as
common law torts), see Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502
(9th Cir. 1981); the Fourth Circuit's treatment of all section 1983 actions as personal in-
jury claims, Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972), and the Third Circuit,
which determined which limitation would be applicable in state court had the action been
brought under state law in Aitchison v. Rafiani, 708 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1983). The
remaining circuits, generally, have varied within this range. See generally Garcia v. Wilson,
731 F.2d 640, 643-48 (10th Cir. 1984) (outlining the cases in each circuit dealing with the
limitations period to be applied to section 1983 actions).
56. 731 F.2d at 648.
57. Id. at 649.
58. Id. at 650.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The first choice was rejected for two reasons. Section 1983 is solely a proce-
dural statute and, hence, one cannot go into court, allege a violation of section 1983, and
expect any remedy to be forthcoming absent a substantive cause of action. Also, not every
state has a statute of limitation applicable to an action created by statute and, thus, states
with no such statute would be forced to engage in the very type of characterization the
court attempted to dispose of in its opinion. Id. at 650 n.3.
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ute of limitation purposes. 62
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority
Realizing that the circuit courts were applying various methods and
criteria in evaluating the applicability of state statutes of limitations
when section 1983 actions were involved, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.6 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens agreed with the
Tenth Circuit's premise that, under section 1988, federal law rather than
state law controls the characterization of section 1983 claims for statute
of limitation purposes. 64 This conclusion was based upon the Court's
interpretation of the " 'predominance of the federal interest' " involved
in utilizing the borrowing procedures of section 1988.65 Thus, only the
length of the limitation period and closely related questions of tolling
and application are left to the states.
6 6
The Court then addressed the issue of whether characterization of
section 1983 claims should be uniform, or whether the claims should be
analyzed individually based upon each claim's specific facts. Aware that
a section 1983 claim can be analogized to several forms of action, each
of which may be governed by a different statute of limitation, the Court
noted that Garcia could have utilized state tort claims for false arrest,
assault and battery, or the special New Mexico statute which allows re-
covery for torts perpetrated by its agents. 6 7 The Court asserted that
Congress intended the application of statutes of limitations to section
1983 claims to be an "uncomplicated task . . . rather than a source of
uncertainty . "..."68 Thus, because two or more periods of limitation
could apply to each section 1983 claim, the Court concluded that Con-
gress would not have sanctioned an interpretation of the statute under
which the facts of each case determine the limitation period.6 9 Contin-
uing its historical review, the Court stated that when section 1983 was
enacted, it was "unlikely that Congress actually foresaw the wide diver-
sity of claims that the new remedy would ultimately embrace." ' 70 The
Court therefore concluded that section 1983 "is fairly construed as a
directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of
62. Id. at 651. Thus, the New Mexico three year statute of limitations for injuries to
the person applied, under which Garcia's claim was timely filed.
63. 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984).
64. 105 S. Ct. at 1943.
65. Id. (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2929 (1984)).
66. 105 S. Ct. at 1943.
67. Id. at 1941. The Court cited Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974), as being
illustrative of the problems which arise when different periods of limitation are applied in
the same case. In Polite, the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, beaten, coerced into pleading
guilty, and then had his car towed away. The court applied a one-year statute of limita-
tions to the false arrest claim, a two-year personal injury statute to the beating and coerced
plea claims, and a six-year statute to the towing claim. 105 S. Ct. at 1946 n.33.
68. Id. at 1946-47.
69. Id. at 1946.
70. id.
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limitations" for all claims under section 1983.71
Finally, the Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that
characterization of section 1983 claims as actions for recovery for per-
sonal injuries is the "best alternative available."'7 2 The Court noted that
when section 1983 was first enacted in 1871, Congress was primarily
concerned with actions which "plainly sounded in tort."' 73 The Court
concluded that, if Congress had been presented with the issue, it would
have characterized section 1983 as allowing remedies for injuries to per-
sonal rights. 74 Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision, ruled that the three-year New Mexico statute governing personal
injury applied, and permitted Garcia to bring his cause of action.
75
2. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In a stinging dissent, Justice O'Connor admonished the majority for
declaring that all section 1983 claims must be considered analogous to
one narrow class of tort. Although she agreed that characterizations of
section 1983 claims were a matter of federal law, she saw no justification
for abandoning the Court's previous practice of applying the statute of
limitation of the most analogous state claim. Justice O'Connor stated
that, by deviating from traditional practices, the Court abrogated the
very policies embodied in section 1988.76
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor considered the majority to be
"groping" in its attempts to discern how Congress in 1871 would have
characterized such claims. 7 7 In her most persuasive argument, Justice
O'Connor cited three recent congressional attempts to standardize sec-
tion 1983 periods of limitation, all of which failed. 78 To her, this failure
clearly indicated a lack of congressional concern for uniformity in such
limitation periods. Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, this normally
persuasive tell-tale of congressional intent was ignored by the major-
ity. 79 Moreover, she argued that a state's ability to legislate detailed and
71. Id. at 1947.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1948.
74. Id. Further, one of the Court's concerns appears to have been that the borrowed
periods of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy. Id. at 1949.
The Court stated that by characterizing all claims under section 1983 as personal injury
claims, the risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations will not serve federal inter-
ests is minimized. According to justice Stevens, because personal injury actions constitute
the major part of the volume of civil litigation in state courts today, it is unlikely that a
period of limitations would ever be fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal
claims. Id.
75. Id. at 1949.
76. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1951.
78. Id. S. 436, 99th Cong., ist Sess. (1985) (bill presented to the Senate Judiciary
Committee proposing an amendment to section 1983 which would bar actions brought
under it which are not filed within 18 months of accrual of a right of action); S. 1983, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposed bill barring section 1983 actions unless they are filed
within four years of accrual of a right of action); see also H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
79. 105 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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specific periods of limitation for diverse section 1983 claims is effectively
foreclosed by the Court's decision since the supremacy clause would dic-
tate that all contrary state legislative proposals be superseded.8 0 Finally,
Justice O'Connor asserted that, because section 1983 claims are usually
joined with claims in tort or contract, which are not section 1983 claims,
the same factual situation will now be governed by two or more separate
statutes of limitation. 8 1 Thus, lower courts will now be faced with the
confusing task of severing section 1983 claims from non-1983 claims
arising out of the same facts.
8 2
D. Analysis and Conclusion
In Garcia, the Supreme Court fashioned an opinion in response to
its inherent uneasiness and irritation with a lack of uniformity in the cir-
cuit courts. The decision supplies, at least facially, a uniform rule of
application within individual states. However, this uniformity is predi-
cated upon arguments which are not overwhelmingly convincing. For
instance, the Court pronounces a federal interest in easily applied,
firmly defined, and uniform rules, yet cites no congressional authority in
support of its findings. In fact, the Court's historical deductions are al-
most oracular, lacking in any legislative language to support its conclu-
sions. The Court's holding entailed a departure from the established
protocol of interpreting legislative inability to act as an indication of
congressional sentiment.8 3 Although the Court is probably correct in its
belief that, at the time section 1983 was enacted, Congress did not antic-
ipate the wide diversity of claims the remedy would ultimately embrace,
the Court's attempt to discern what the forty-second Congress would
have done is inappropriate given the recent legislative considerations of
the specific question. Recent bills which have addressed and ultimately
rejected the standardization of limitation periods were not even men-
tioned in the majority's opinion.
84
Furthermore, the Court's assurance that uniform application of
state statutes of limitations will not discriminate against the federal civil
rights remedy does not withstand scrutiny. 85 Forcing admittedly diverse
actions into the narrow confines of a single limitation period is unwise.
Although the Court presumes that such a limitation would never dis-
criminate against or be inconsistent with federal law, it is reasonably
foreseeable that a section 1983 claim not sounding in tort will be barred
by a short state limitation period, requiring the plaintiff to assert other
state causes of action and perhaps defeating federal jurisdiction.
As Justice O'Connor intimates, the "half baked conformity"
80. Id. at 1952.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. " [C]aution must temper judicial creativity in the face of legislative ... silence.'"
Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1952 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)),
84. See supra note 78.
85. See supra note 74.
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achieved by the Court's decision "does not so much resolve confusion as
banish it to the lower courts." 8 6 For example, the Court's expansive
definition of what constitutes a personal injury leaves unresolved the
question of whether, when faced with a bald assertion of a section 1983
violation, trial courts will be able to blindly apply the state tort statute of
limitation or be forced to sift through the factual situation to determine
if a personal injury claim has been made. Probably, a court's duty under
Garcia is to ascertain that a section 1983 claim is made by the facts, and
then to apply the state personal injury statute of limitation regardless of
the nature of those facts.
87
Statutes of limitation should reflect pragmatic considerations,
whether they be the frailty of human memory or the lasting testimony of
written agreements. Although the majority of section 1983 claims are
personal injury claims, and thus warrant a timely resolution of disputes,
other section 1983 actions involve claims sounding in contract, the char-
acter of which may not necessitate a more restrictive limitation period.
The Court appears to have disregarded this fundamental reason for va-
rying limitation periods, preferring to mandate uniformity in an effort to
avoid inherent complexities of fact finding. And yet, complexities are
often inextricable portions of the law. Uniformity and simplicity do not
always solve underlying problems, even though they may facilitate some
judicial efficiency.
It appears that in Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court, while in pur-
suit of a bright line rule, put far too much emphasis on standardizing
section 1983 procedure, without due consideration of the substantive
difficulties inherent in such actions. Perhaps a better resolution would
have been to leave Congress the task of outlining the various factual
situations which give rise to section 1983 claims and the specific limita-
tion periods each cause of action.
III. CAPITAL CITIES CABLE, INC. V. CRISP: SUPREME COURT RULES THAT
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS STATE ATrEMPTS TO REGULATE THE
RETRANSMISSION OF CABLE TELEVISION SIGNALS
In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,8 8 the Supreme Court held that
state regulation of the retransmission of signals by cable television oper-
ators is preempted by federal law in the form of Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) regulations. In so holding, the Court
86. 105 S. Ct. at 1952-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that one
aspect of this confusion had arisen even before "the ink of the Tenth Circuit's decision was
dry." In the Tenth Circuit cases handed down the same day as Garcia in order to harmo-
nize decisions, see supra note 51, Kansas had a two-year statute for injury to the ights of
another, Utah had no such provision and had to rely on a four-year residuary statute, and
Colorado had two periods governing injury to personal rights. The Tenth Circuit resolved
this confusion by applying a three-year residuary statute, Id. at 1953.
87. Thus, Garcia mandates the anomalous situation in which a tort statute of limitation
is applied to a section 1983 wrongful termination claim which is based solely upon the
statutory right to be free from discrimination in entering into a contract. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
88. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
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invalidated an Oklahoma statute which required that cable television op-
erators delete all alcoholic beverage advertisements received from out-
of-state sources and reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which
had upheld the validity of the state regulation.8 9 Interestingly, the
Tenth Circuit based its decision partly upon the Supreme Court's recent
summary dismissal of a similar case which challenged, on first amend-
ment grounds, the constitutionality of state regulation of alcohol adver-
tisements. 90 The Supreme Court's reversal in Capital Cities, however,
was predicated upon federal preemption, an issue the Tenth Circuit did
not even address.
A. Facts
Cable operators owning franchises in Oklahoma brought suit
against Crisp, the director of the Oklahoma Alcohol Control Board, for
unconstitutionally restraining their right to commercial free speech. 9 '
Crisp was charged with the primary responsibility of enforcing
Oklahoma laws regulating the sale and consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages. Under the threat of criminal prosecution by the Alcohol Control
Board, the cable operators were required by Oklahoma law9 2 to "block
out" network advertisements of wine. 93 Although it was technically pro-
hibited for cable operators to solicit or accept advertisements for alco-
holic beverages, it had become standard practice for the state to allow
relays of out-of-state programing that included advertisements for
wine. 94 When Crisp notified the cable operators that this acquiescence
was to end, the cable operators sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
contending that the Oklahoma law and constitution 9 5 violated the fed-
89. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1982).
90. Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 459 U.S. 807 (1982). Queensgate
involved a summary dismissal of an Ohio Supreme Court decision upholding, under the
twenty-first amendment, see infra note 97, state regulations which prohibited retail liquor
permit holders from advertising retail prices of alcoholic beverages. The regulation was
deemed constitutional by the Ohio court despite first and fourteenth amendment chal-
lenges (freedom of speech and equal protection). For a discussion of Queensgate, see infra
note 103.
91. 699 F.2d at 492.
92. Under the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, the advertisement of "alco-
holic beverages or the sale of the same within the State of Oklahoma," is prohibited, ex-
cept for on-premises signs which are strictly regulated. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516
(West Supp. 1984).
93. Since hard liquor is not generally advertised on television and 3.2% beer was not
by definition an "alcoholic beverage," the enforcement of the advertising ban was directed
soley at wine commercials. 699 F.2d at 492. Despite the fact that the FCC's regulations
and federal copyright law prohibit cable operators from altering or modifying television
signals relayed to subscribers, see 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3) (1982); 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b)
(1984); and note 120 infra, the Oklahoma attorney general had declared that prohibitions
against alcoholic beverage advertising applied to cable television in the same manner as
they applied to broadcast television. 699 F.2d at 492.
94. Id.
95. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corpo-
ration to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the state of Oklahoma except for
one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words, 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store'." This sec-
tion has subsequently been repealed and recodified in the Oklahoma Constitution. OKLA.
CONST. art. XXVIII.
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eral commerce and supremacy clauses, denied them their first amend-
ment right of free speech, and deprived them of the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of equal protection.
9 6
Crisp moved to dismiss the case, asserting overriding twenty-first
amendment concerns.9 7 Basing its decision on a four-part analysis ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,9 8 the district court concluded that while the as-
serted governmental interest of protecting the health and welfare of the
public was substantial, the regulations only indirectly advanced the goal
of reducing alcohol consumption and "were more extensive than neces-
sary to serve that interest." 9 9 The district court entered summary judg-
ment for the cable operators, pursuant to which it issued a declaratory
judgment stating that the pertinent Oklahoma laws violated the United
States Constitution.10 0 Permanent injunctions were also entered by the
court against Crisp, preventing him and the Alcohol Control Board from
enforcing the law against the plaintiffs. Crisp's attempts to stay the per-
manent injunctions were unsuccessful. 10 1
In October of 1982, in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Com-
mission,'0 2 the Supreme Court dismissed, without an opinion, an appeal
from the Supreme Court of Ohio involving substantially the same issues
as Capital Cities. 10 3 In November, the Tenth Circuit heard oral argu-
ments on Crisp's appeal.
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit focused upon the extent to which the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the Queensgate case should be ascribed precedential
96. The equal protection claim was based upon the disparity of treatment between the
print and broadcast media. Oklahoma permits advertisements for alcoholic beverages that
are carried in newspapers and other publications printed outside of the state but sold in
the state. 699 F.2d at 493 n.l.
97. The twenty-first amendment grants the states power to prohibit liquor sales within
their boundries and to regulate the time, places, and circumstances under which liquor
may be sold.
98. 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980). In determining the validity of a regulation which
affects commercial speech, the following questions were presented in Central Hudson: 1) Is
the commercial speech protected by the first amendment? [Does it concern a lawful activity
and is it not misleading?] 2) Is the asserted governmental interest substantial? 3) Does
the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted? and 4) Is the regula-
tion more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest?
99. 699 F.2d at 493.
100. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101. 699 F.2d at 493.
102. 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
103. See supra note 90 and infra note 106. The Ohio Supreme Court in Queensgate ap-
plied the Central Hudson four-part test and held that the speech involved was protected,
that the govenmental interest in discouraging the excessive consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages was substantial and within the powers granted to the states under the twenty-first
amendment, that the regulations controlled alcoholic beverages rather than speech, that
the regulations did in fact advance the governmental interest, and, finally, that the prohibi-
tion against such advertising was the narrowest method available to prevent excessive con-




weight in deciding Crisp's appeal. 10 4 Acknowledging the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hicks v. Miranda,'0 5 that a summary dismissal is a deci-
sion on the merits of a case and that such a summary disposition is bind-
ing upon the lower federal courts until direct decisions by the Supreme
Court indicated otherwise, the Tenth Circuit felt compelled to abide by
the Queensgate decision. According to the court, although a summary dis-
position merely upholds the judgment of a lower court and does not
necessarily reflect the Court's agreement with the lower court's opinion,
the precedential effect of such summary dismissals " 'prevent[s] lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions'....,,106
The Tenth Circuit thus held that the Control Board's regulations in
Capital Cities were binding on the cable operators. Believing that the
Supreme Court's dismissal in Queensgate mandated this result, 10 7 and ap-
parently unimpressed with potential preemption problems, 10 8 the court
ordered that the permanent injunctions be dissolved, reversing the dis-
trict court's summary declaratory judgments. 10 9
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision without reaching the first and four-
teenth amendment claims presented by basing the decision upon federal
pre-emption grounds. 1O After outlining the constitutional boundaries
104. 699 F.2d at 495.
105. 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
106. 699 F.2d at 496 (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)). According
to Justice Brennan's concurrence in Mandel, upon which the Tenth Circuit relied, the test
for determining the precedential value of a summary disposition requires a court to first
ascertain that the constitutional issues were the same as those in the case in question and,
second, if they were, the court must ascertain that the judgment was in fact based upon the
constitutional issues rather than " 'some alternative nonconstitutional ground.' " 699 F.2d
at 496 (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. at 177) (Brennan, J., concurring)). To the
Tenth Circuit, the issues in Queensgate appeared substantially similar: whether the twenty-
first amendment, in the face of individuals' constitutional interests, authorized state regu-
lation of alcoholic beverages. The court stated that, because it could discern no noncon-
stitutional grounds on which the Supreme Court could arguably have decided Queensgate, it
felt that the Queensgate dismissal was binding. 699 F.2d at 497. However, noting that the
Supreme Court in Mandel warned that some courts were too preoccupied by summary
dismissals and failed to undertake an independent examination of the merits, the Tenth
Circuit painstakingly went through the merits, applied the Central Hudson test, see supra note
98, and essentially ruled in accord with the Ohio Supreme Court in Queensgate. 699 F.2d at
498-99.
107. The court stated: "We recognize that the cable operators especially are placed in a
difficult position; however, nothing in the First Amendment prohibits this result." 699
F.2d at 502.
108. The pre-emption issue had been raised at the district court level. See infra note
110.
109. Capital Cities, 699 F.2d at 502.
110. 104 S. Ct. at 2698. The Court justified this deviation from its normal practice of
restricting its review to issues presented in the circuit court's ruling by stating that while
the issue of pre-emption was barely acknowledged by the circuit court, it had been pled in
the district court and the district court had made sufficient findings to enable the Court to
resolve the question. Id. at 2699-2700.
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of FCC regulatory authority,"' the Court stated that the FCC, acting
under the Cable Communications Act of 1934,112 "has unambiguously
expressed its intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation of [the]
entire array of signals carried by cable television systems." ' 13 A form of
"dualism" has been implemented by the FCC, permitting state and local
authorities to grant franchises to cable operators while the FCC retains
the exclusive power to regulate all operational aspects of cable commu-
nications, including signal carriage and technical standards. 1 4 Non-
federal officials are given responsibility only for the non-operational as-
pects of cable franchising." 5 Furthermore, specific federal regulations
have been enacted, including the FCC's "must carry" rule requiring
cable operators to transmit "in full" broadcast signals significantly
viewed in local communities.'16 The Court thus concluded that the
Oklahoma advertising ban, by reaching beyond the regulatory power
vested in local regulatory authorities, had trespassed into the FCC's ex-
clusive domain."i 7 Since the FCC's regulations were found to be based
upon rational and reasonable foundations, the state regulations had to
succumb to the enumerated federal interests.
Addressing the twenty-first amendment issue, the Court stated that
while the amendment permits the states to regulate the importation and
use of intoxicating liquors within their borders, such regulation does not
permit the states to "ignore their obligations under other provisions of
the Constitution." '" 8 Thus, although the twenty-first amendment is an
exception to the extensive power of the commerce clause, a state's
power to indirectly regulate substantial state interests is limited when
federal authority is directly interfered with. 19
1ll. Id. at 2700-01. The Supreme Court noted that an administrative regulation has
the same force and effect as a federal statute and is subject to judicial review only to ascer-
tain if the administrator has exceeded his statutory authority or has acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. As long as the administrator's choice is reasonable and reflects
the congressional intent, it should not be disturbed. Thus, the Court ruled that the Com-
mission's comprehensive authority includes the power to regulate cable communication
systems. Id. at 2701.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1934).
113. 104 S. Ct. at 2701.
114. Id. at 2702 n.8. Under this "deliberately structured dualism," the FCC also re-
tains control over pay cable, leased channel regulation, access, and areas of franchise re-
sponsibilities. Id.
115. These responsibilities include bonding agreements, maintenance of rights of way,
franchise selection, and conditions of operation and construction. Report and Order Ter-
minating Rulemaking Proceedings, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,608, 34,611 (1975).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
117. Id. The Court outlined three well-established principles to determine whether a
federal regulation will pre-empt a state law: 1) Has Congress expressed a clear intent to
pre-empt state law? 2) Has Congress, despite the absence of explicit language, drafted
such comprehensive federal legislation that its intent to occupy the entire field is evident?
and 3) Is compliance with both state and federal law impossible, or does the state law
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress? Id. at 2700. Further, the Court concluded that "the FCC's preemptive
intent could not be more explicit or unambiguous." Id. at 2703 n.10.
118. Id. at 2707.
119. Id. Although the Court accepted Oklahoma's judgment that regulation of liquor
advertisement represented a reasonable means to achieve temperance in the state, the
legitimacy of Oklahoma's interest was weakened by the fact that the state's regulation of
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Pragmatic considerations were also cited by the Court in support of
the FCC's hegemony in the field. 120 Whereas local broadcasters are
able to receive notification of advertisements prior to transmission,
cable operators receive numerous transmissions by satellite and must
retransmit the signals without notification of the timing or content of
advertisements contained in those signals. 12 1 To develop the capacity
to monitor the signals and delete every wine commercial before retrans-
mission would be a "prohibitively burdensome task." Citing the district
court, the Supreme Court agreed that "[tihere exists no feasible way for
[the cable operators] to block out the wine advertisements."'
12 2
Therefore, the Court concluded, "the application of Oklahoma's al-
coholic beverage advertising ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable
operators in that state is preempted by federal law and ... the Twenty-
first Amendment does not save the regulation from preemption."'
23
D. Analysis and Conclusion
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp merits scholarly attention, not so
much for its insight into the law of federal pre-emption, an aspect of the
case which has been rendered less significant by the Cable Communica-
tion Policy Act of 1984,124 but for its illustration of the problems the
lower federal courts face in attempting to ascribe weight to Supreme
Court summary dispositions. For instance, the Supreme Court's opin-
ion, resting as it does on an issue not even addressed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, must be disconcerting to the court of appeals. Two factors existed
which, if focused upon by the Tenth Circuit, might have led to a differ-
ent outcome. First, given that pre-emption arguments were raised at the
district court level, it is somewhat surprising that the Tenth Circuit did
not address the issue. Second, the Tenth Circuit repeatedly stated that
the issues in Queensgate were substantially similar to those present in Cap-
ital Cities and that the Queensgate holding did not rest upon any alternative
advertisements for alcoholic beverages was underinclusive. For instance, the fact that ad-
vertisements for liquor and 3.2% beer were permitted in local newspapers and magazines
printed out of state but sold within Oklahoma tended to lessen the necessity of
Oklahoma's cable ban. The Court took this factor into account when it concluded that the
limited state interest did not outweigh the significant interference with federal objectives.
Id. at 2709.
120. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982), includes a
section on compulsory licensing of cable operators. Royalties are paid into a fund in re-
turn for the waiving of a requirement to receive permission from a copyright owner before
retransmission of instant broadcast signals. 17 U.S.C. § 111. Congress had to include
such a clause because cable operators would face insurmountable technical and logistical
obstacles if they were required to block out all programs for which they had not obtained
direct permission from the copyright owner to use. 104 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
121. Id. at 2705.
122. Id.
123. Id. In justifying its holding, the Court stated that if the state regulations were
allowed to be enforced, the public would be deprived of specialized broadcast and non-
broadcast cable services, limiting the programming options available to the public. d. at
2707.
124. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
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nonconstitutional grounds. 12 5 However, although Queensgate involved
the question of whether the twenty-first amendment enhanced states'
authority to regulate commercial speech concerning alcoholic bever-
ages, it did not involve nearly the degree or magnitude of interstate con-
cerns as those confronted in Capital Cities. 126 Thus, although the issues
may have been similar, the underlying considerations and constitutional
implications may have been less prevalent in Queensgate than in Capital
Cities.
More significantly, however, the Supreme Court's opinion failed to
offer any guidelines concerning the future application of summary dis-
missals, leaving the Tenth Circuit uncertain if its interpretation of the
weight to be accorded summary dismissals was correct. The Court
never addressed whether Queensgate did in fact rest on constitutional is-
sues substantially similar to those in Capital Cities, avoiding the whole
morass by simply addressing the issue of federal pre-emption. Thus,
although the decision was clear-cut for the Supreme Court, it left the
door open for future miscalculation of the weight to be ascribed sum-
mary dismissals.
For the purposes of federal pre-emption law, the ramifications of
the Capital Cities decision may not be as broad as one might expect in
light of the recent passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984.127 The Act reaffirms and strengthens state and local authority to
regulate cable transmissions and curtails Capital Cities' judicial advoca-
tion of relaxed FCC policies.' 2 8 For instance, the Act codifies the pro-
gram of "deliberately structured dualism" which previously existed,' 2 9
but gives states broader authority to regulate franchising grants, includ-
ing fees and renewal, rate regulation, program content and rights-of-
way. 13
0
Thus, although the Capital Cities decision made it appear that local
governing bodies were under the imminent threat of being pre-empted
by more liberal federal regulations, with the passage of the Act localities
no longer need feel that their powers are exercised at the grace of the
FCC.' 3 On the other hand, while some view the recent relaxation of
125. See supra note 106.
126. For instance, the advertisement in Queensgale involved a newsletter distributed lo-
cally in Cincinnati. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138 (1982). In fact, the Supreme
Court's dismissal was based upon "want of substantial federal question." 459 U.S. 807
(1982).
127. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1985).
128. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 552(c) (West Supp. 1985) ("Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to prohibit any State or any franchising authority from enacting or en-
forcing any consumer protection law, to the extent not inconsistent with this sub-
chapter."); 47 U.S.C.A. § 556(a) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to affect
any authority of any State, political subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising author-
ity, regarding matters of public health, safety, and welfare, to the extent consistent with the
express provisions of this subchapter.").
129. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
130. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 541-547 (Part III, Franchising and Regulation) (West Supp.
1985).
131. H. R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONC.
& AD. NEWs 4655, 4656-57 (The Cable Act "'[e]stablishes the authority of local govern-
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FCC regulations' 3 2 as a sign that local and state governing bodies are
now permitted to fill in the vacated interstices of cable regulation, ' 3 3 it
can be asserted that the policies behind the FCC's easing of restrictions
fail to support this interpretation.' 3 4 Rather, the FCC's relaxation of
regulations has a dual purpose: to permit cable subscribers greater ac-
cess to cable services and to foster new and innovative communications
services.13 5 When viewed in this light, strict regulations by local gov-
erning bodies would be contrary to FCC goals. In any event, the extent
to which state regulations of the kind involved in Capital Cities might be
upheld under the Act remains to be seen.
Finally, when one strips away the varnish of legal theories abundant
in this decision, a pragmatic consideration comes to the fore. Specifi-
cally, while dressing this ruling up in appropriate legal characterizations,
the Court seems to have been driven to its conclusion by the confines of
technological reality: there exists no feasible way for cable operators to
block out wine advertisements when signals from outside the state are
received. Because the Supreme Court did not reach the first and four-
teenth amendment arguments, later cases involving local or state cable
regulations which allegedly violate first and fourteenth amendment
rights will find little support from Capital Cities.'3 6 Unfortunately, the
Capital Cities case and the enactment of the Cable Communications Pol-
icy Act of 1984 seem to give rise to more questions than are answered by
the decision, particularly in the areas of the constitutionality of state reg-
ulation of out-of-state signals and the precedential weight of summary
dismissals; issues which were raised by the Tenth Circuit and left un-
resolved by the Supreme Court.
Joseph E. Kovarik
ments to regulate cable television through the franchise process" and -[glrants local gov-
ernments substantial authority to enforce franchise agreements.").
132. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
133. See Note, The 1984 Cable Flip Flop From Capital Cities v. Crisp to the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Ad.l, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 557, 589 (1985); see also Meyerson, The Cable Commnnmia-
lions Polio" Ac of 1984:.4 Balancing Art on the Coaxial I Wires, 19 GEO. L. REV. 543, 551 (1981).
134. i04 S. Ct. at 2703. The Court in Capital Cities noted that the recent deregulatory
trend is designed to further the FCC's goal of program diversity and should not be inter-
preted as an abdication of regulatory power by the FCC.
135. Id.
136. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.) (cable
operator brought action against Los Angeles claiming that the city's regulatory procedure
of auctioning the exclusive right to provide cable services in certain areas violated tie
operator's first and fourteenth amendment rights; court held that limited access violated
the first amendment where the facilities involved were capable of carrying more tian one
system), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
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